When does a claimant “discover” a fraud that a regulator has publicly described but stopped short of calling dishonest? In Garry White and others v Uber London Limited and others [2026] EWHC 2651 (Comm), handed down on 19 October 2026, Birt J answered: once enough to plead it is known, or could with reasonable diligence have been found out. Deciding a preliminary issue, he held that the claims of nearly 13,300 London black cab drivers, and of the assignee of two former minicab companies, are time-barred (paras 2, 174). The parties had agreed that, if the claims were time-barred, the entire claim must be dismissed (para 7).
What the case was about
The claimants allege that Uber conspired to injure them by unlawful means between mid-2012 and 14 March 2018, including by fraudulently misrepresenting to Transport for London how its booking system worked and by dishonestly failing to disclose its use of certain technologies. They say that, but for this, Uber would never have obtained its London private hire operator licence. Uber denies every allegation (paras 2–4).
The claims were issued in May and June 2024, after the ordinary six-year limitation period had expired. The claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, which postpones the start of time in cases of fraud or deliberate concealment until the claimant discovered it or could with reasonable diligence have done so. Their case was that they could not have done so until a reasonable period after the hearing of Uber’s licensing appeal and the Chief Magistrate’s judgment on 25–26 June 2018, when the witness evidence and judgment became public (paras 5, 68). The issue was tried on 20 sample black cab claimants plus the assignee, assuming the pleaded facts to be true (paras 6–7).
The key document was TfL’s decision letter of 22 September 2017 refusing to renew Uber London’s licence (para 52). It said that Uber London had misled TfL in 2014 about how bookings were accepted, that its answers had been materially false and misleading, and that it had not been open with TfL about the “Greyball” software. A trade association published the letter on its website on 20 December 2017 (paras 55–56). Reports of Uber’s “Ripley” kill-switch tool followed in January 2018 (paras 63–64).
What the High Court decided
In a fraud case, time runs once the claimant knows, or could with reasonable diligence have found out, enough to plead a claim that would not be struck out; proof that the fraud happened is not required (paras 90, 92). Whether section 32(1)(a) applied to a claim pleaded in conspiracy was disputed, so Uber agreed that the court should apply both that test and the related “worthwhile claim” test (para 92). The burden was on the claimants (para 105), and time is not postponed while a claimant evaluates its prospects (para 93).
The judge held that the decision letter was reasonably available to every claimant, including the assignee, who was not a cab driver: anyone interested in a claim against Uber would have followed a widely reported story and could be expected to find it (para 126). TfL had not expressly found that Uber deliberately misled it, but a fraud case can properly be pleaded on a public authority’s findings, and the letter described Uber’s account as precise but false. There was enough to plead an inference of deliberate and dishonest misrepresentation (paras 137–138).
The claimants could therefore have pleaded their claims within a reasonable period (for example, four to six weeks) after the letter was published, and the Ripley allegations by February 2018; they did not need the licensing-appeal evidence or judgment (para 145). In any event, that later material did not materially add to the case on dishonesty (paras 146–148). The answer to the preliminary issue was “no”, and all the claims are time-barred (paras 152, 174).
That conclusion made the claimants’ actual knowledge non-determinative. Only three people gave evidence about it; most sample claimants gave none (paras 113, 153). Of the three, the judge found that two already had sufficient knowledge without the licensing-appeal material, while the third, a driver who took no interest in a claim, did not (paras 159, 166, 172).
Why it matters
- A regulator’s published findings can start the clock. Where an authority sets out facts from which dishonesty can properly be inferred, time may run even if the authority itself stops short of a finding of dishonesty (paras 137–138, 145).
- Waiting for a better record does not postpone time. That an appeal, a hearing or further evidence was coming did not matter once there was enough to plead; section 32 is about what could be known, not about the most efficient way to run litigation (para 134).
- The burden is on the claimants, including in group actions. It was not for Uber to show what the non-testifying sample claimants knew. Had it been necessary to decide their actual knowledge, the judge said he did not see how, without more, any of them could have discharged the burden (para 154).
- Reasonable diligence is an objective standard applied to the actual claimant. A claimant’s own choice to await developments, or lack of interest in investigating, does not change what it could have discovered (paras 102, 134).
- In our view, the decision will be closely read by funders and claimant firms assembling group actions that build on a regulator’s published findings: the six years may begin shortly after those findings become public, not when the full evidence emerges.
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Read the full judgment: Garry White and others v Uber London Limited and others [2026] EWHC 2651 (Comm) (The National Archives).