Can the largest online platforms resist Ofcom’s demands for content moderation data under the Online Safety Act 2023? Not on the grounds argued, held the Divisional Court on 30 October 2026 in R (Meta Platforms Inc and WhatsApp LLC) v The Office of Communications [2026] EWHC 2779 (Admin), heard together with similar claims by X and TikTok UK. In a joint judgment, Singh LJ and Collins Rice J refused permission on most grounds and dismissed the proportionality and human rights challenges on their merits (paras 1–2, 170).
What the case was about
On 10 February 2026 Ofcom issued information notices under section 100 of the Online Safety Act (“OSA”) to each claimant, and to other regulated providers, as part of its monitoring and evaluation programme (para 21). They sought six categories of information, including user activity by age group, content moderation actions, UK users’ exposure to actioned content, appeals and user reports (para 22). Data was requested from 1 January 2024, before the OSA duties began, to give a baseline for tracking change, in three tranches with deadlines running to March 2027 (paras 21, 23). Failure to comply is an offence, subject to a defence where compliance was not reasonably practicable and all reasonably practicable steps have since been taken (para 12).
The notices followed about a year of consultation with the platforms (paras 28–29). Versions issued in November 2025 were withdrawn when it emerged that the decision-maker lacked delegated authority, and were re-issued once he was authorised (para 31). The claimants argued that the notices circumvented the OSA’s transparency regime, sought information Ofcom did not “require”, should have been preceded by an impact assessment, were (for TikTok UK) apparently predetermined, departed from Ofcom’s guidance, were disproportionate and breached their Convention rights (para 34).
What the High Court decided
Circumvention was not reasonably arguable. The transparency regime is about publication, whereas the notices sought information for Ofcom’s own purposes, and that regime was not yet operational; the general power in section 100 was not cut down by it (paras 43–44, 46, 50).
“Require” means necessary, but the question is whether Ofcom’s assessment that it needs the information is rational, not an objective question for the court (paras 56–57). Preparing codes of practice and carrying out research were lawful purposes (para 68), the statutory list of purposes is non-exhaustive, and Ofcom need not have a specific task in mind (para 71). Even if Ofcom had breached its duty to specify why it required the information, section 31(3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 would require permission to be refused, because the outcome would not have been substantially different (para 69).
The impact assessment duty in section 7 of the Communications Act 2003 arises only if a proposal appears to Ofcom to be “important”, reviewed for rationality; it was reasonably open to Ofcom to treat the notices as individual decisions (paras 95, 97). TikTok UK’s predetermination case relied on a “wholly decontextualised” reading of selective facts: a regulator needs an open mind, not an empty one (paras 106, 119–120). The guidance challenge failed in substance and under section 31(3D) (paras 127–128).
On proportionality, the court applied the four-stage Bank Mellat test and made its own assessment (paras 131–132). The relevant burden is the marginal cost a notice adds over the baseline of the OSA’s other duties (para 139). The claimants’ evidence, such as X’s estimate of “millions of pounds”, was insufficiently specific about each notice’s additional burden (paras 143–145), and the court held it could not give significant weight to generalised objections untethered to resource baselines (para 148). Without relying on any significant deference to Ofcom, the court found the evidence could not show any notice was disproportionate (paras 161–162). Questions about future repeat requests and sanctions were left “for another day” (para 158). The human rights claims failed for the same reasons; any control of use of property was “minimal” and proportionate (paras 164, 167–168).
Why it matters
- A broad information-gathering power. Section 100 lets Ofcom require data to decide whether to exercise its functions, including research and code-making, without a specific project in view (paras 70–72).
- Show the additional burden in context. The court expects differential costings against a clear baseline; generalised claims about scale did not carry weight (paras 146–148).
- Consultation matters to the outcome. Shortcomings in the information platforms gave Ofcom during consultation were, the court held, theirs to address (para 159).
- Section 31(3D) did real work. The “highly likely not substantially different” test provided an alternative basis for refusing permission on three separate grounds (paras 69, 99, 128).
- In our view, regulated firms facing information demands should put specific, quantified burden evidence before the regulator at the consultation stage; here, the evidence remained insufficiently specific both during consultation and in court (paras 147–148, 159–161).
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Read the full judgment: R (Meta Platforms Inc and WhatsApp LLC) v The Office of Communications [2026] EWHC 2779 (Admin) (The National Archives).