Can a state keep laws criminalising sex between men on the statute book because they are “traditional”? Not in Trinidad and Tobago, held the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on 10 November 2026 in The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and others v Jason Jones [2026] UKPC 38. Giving the judgment of the Board, Lord Sales and Lord Burrows allowed Mr Jones’ appeal and dismissed the Attorney General’s cross-appeal. Sections 13 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act 1986 (“SOA 1986”) infringe his fundamental rights and must be interpreted so that they do not criminalise private, consensual sexual relations between adults of the same sex (para 89). The precise form of order is still to be settled (paras 88–89).
What the case was about
Section 13 of the SOA 1986 criminalises “buggery”. Section 16 criminalises “serious indecency”, with an exception for private, consensual acts between a man and a woman aged 16 or over, alongside other specified exceptions (paras 2, 14–15). Mr Jones, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago who has been openly gay since he was 16, gave evidence of near-daily harassment and abuse and of his fear of arrest and prosecution; the Attorney General filed no evidence, so it was unchallenged (paras 3–4).
In 2017 Mr Jones claimed that the two sections infringed his rights under sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution, including the right to respect for private and family life (paras 17, 19). Rampersad J agreed in 2018 and later modified the provisions so that they no longer criminalised private, consensual sexual conduct between adults (paras 20–21, 87). In March 2025 a majority of the Court of Appeal held that the provisions repealed and re-enacted earlier law with modifications, so that under section 6(2) of the Constitution the older provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1925 (as amended in 1980) were substituted. All the judges below agreed that the provisions were not “reasonably justifiable” under section 13 of the Constitution (paras 22–23, 55).
What the Privy Council decided
The 1986 provisions were new law, not saved “existing law”. It was common ground that section 6(1) did not protect the 1986 provisions, because they derogated from fundamental rights further than the earlier law, for example through heavier sentences (paras 29–30). Section 6(2) applies only to an enactment that “repeals and re-enacts with modifications” an existing law (paras 32–33). The Board held that the Court of Appeal majority made an error of law: sections 13 and 16 were part of a fresh package, following a Law Commission report, to modernise the law of sexual offences (paras 35–37). Section 6(3) distinguishes re-enactment with modifications from “making different provisions” or “modifying” the law, and the 1986 provisions fell into the latter categories (paras 39, 42). The long title, which speaks of an Act to “repeal and replace”, pointed the same way (para 43). Savings clauses must be read narrowly, because a wide reading would undermine a central purpose of the Constitution and freeze old law beyond the courts’ scrutiny (paras 44–46).
Justification is judged now, not in 1986. Before the Board, the Attorney General argued for the first time that justifiability should be assessed as at 1986, when the Act was passed (para 56). The Board rejected that: the relevant time is when the question is before the court (para 57). The wording “is shown not to be reasonably justifiable” looks to the present (para 58); proportionality is assessed when the law is applied to the claimant (para 59); the Constitution is a living instrument (para 61); and the weight of a supermajority vote can reduce over time, here four decades on (para 62).
No justification was shown. Under section 13, Mr Jones bore the burden of showing that the provisions were not reasonably justifiable, and the Board held that he had discharged it (paras 58, 81). Applying the four-stage proportionality test from Suraj, the margin allowed to the state may be wider for legislation passed by a supermajority (para 54). But it narrows where a particularly important facet of a person’s existence or identity is at stake, and this case concerned the core of Mr Jones’ right to respect for private and family life (paras 68–69). The Attorney General filed no evidence and relied on the laws being “traditional” (paras 67, 70). The Board said that the mere fact that a repressive law has survived from colonial times cannot be a legitimate objective (para 72). It did not rule out that maintaining genuine social traditions might be one, but that would need evidence, and there was none (para 73). The Attorney General’s justification therefore failed at the first stage; and even assuming a legitimate objective, the provisions did not strike a fair balance (paras 74–75). The Board found the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Dudgeon v United Kingdom persuasive (paras 76–79).
Remedy. The Board’s provisional view is that Rampersad J’s order should be upheld, as it removes the criminalisation under these provisions of private, consensual sexual conduct between adults. Mr Jones’ counsel, who asked for the two sections to be deleted entirely, may make written submissions, and the Attorney General may reply (paras 86–89).
Why it matters
- Savings clauses read narrowly. Where Parliament reviews an area afresh and replaces colonial-era law, the new provisions may fall outside the savings clause and become open to challenge. Section 6(2) itself appears to be unique to Trinidad and Tobago (paras 31, 44–48, 51).
- Timing of the test. Whether legislation passed by supermajority is “reasonably justifiable” is judged when the court considers it, so older laws are measured against present-day values (paras 57, 61–63).
- Tradition needs evidence. A law’s long pedigree is not enough; a state relying on social tradition must prove how widely it is still accepted and whether it fits prevailing values (paras 72–73).
- A clear regional trend. The Board referred to decisions in Belize, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, Dominica and Saint Lucia, and said that “the trend is clear” (para 80).
- In our view, a government defending such a law against a proportionality challenge cannot rely simply on its age. Reliance on a continuing social tradition needs evidence, and even a legitimate aim leaves the fair-balance requirement to be met (paras 72–75). The final order, after further written submissions, will settle the remedy (para 88).
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Read the full judgment: The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and others v Jason Jones [2026] UKPC 38 (The National Archives).