Can a council escape its duty to house a homeless family by pointing to the family leaving accommodation that was never suitable in the first place? On 17 July 2026 the Court of Appeal said no. In R (Griffiths-Fowell) v Birmingham City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 920, the Court dismissed the council’s appeal and held that the main housing duty does not end under section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996 where the accommodation the applicant left was unsuitable.
What the case was about
Birmingham accepted that it owed the respondent the “main housing duty” under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, at that stage in respect of a household that included her brother, who is paralysed and uses a wheelchair (para 7). Birmingham placed them in a series of temporary properties, the last being a maisonette at 7 Holden Close, which lacked the adaptations the brother needed and could not be made suitable within the four weeks the council had estimated; months later the works were still unfinished (paras 18–21, 96). When the respondent spent a few nights in supported accommodation during a mental-health crisis, the council decided its duty had ended under section 193(6)(d), on the footing that she had “voluntarily ceased to occupy” 7 Holden Close as her only or principal home (para 29). A High Court judge, HHJ Rawlings, granted a declaration that the council had been and remained in breach of the section 193(2) duty from 2 July 2024 (para 31). By the appeal, the respondent no longer sought to live with her brother, but because the declaration remained in place, the dispute stayed live (paras 68–69).
What the Court of Appeal decided
Lord Justice Singh and Lord Justice Holgate — with whom Lord Justice Phillips agreed — dismissed the council’s appeal (paras 119–120). On the central point of construction, the “accommodation made available” in section 193(6)(d) must be suitable: read with section 206, an authority discharges its housing functions only by securing suitable accommodation, so the duty is not brought to an end when an applicant leaves accommodation that was unsuitable (paras 107, 109, 114). That reading matched the settled approach to the neighbouring section 193(6)(b) (R (Best) v Oxford City Council) (para 110). The Court also rejected the council’s argument that judicial review should not have been used because the applicant had an alternative remedy — a review under section 202 and an appeal to the county court under section 204. While Part 7 challenges should generally take that route, the council raised the objection only in a skeleton served the day before trial; there was “an air of unreality” about the stance, and the judge was entitled to press on (paras 82–85). Finally, read fairly and as a whole, the judge had in substance applied public-law principles, and only one conclusion on suitability was in any event reasonably open (paras 95, 98).
Why it matters
- Unsuitable accommodation does not end the main housing duty. Section 193(6)(d) is read together with the section 206 suitability requirement: an applicant who leaves unsuitable accommodation has not brought the authority’s duty to an end (paras 107–114).
- Raise “alternative remedy” objections at the outset, not at trial. Judicial review remains a remedy of last resort in homelessness cases, but a council that sits on the point until the eve of trial may find the court hears the claim anyway (paras 81–85).
- A declaration can keep an appeal alive. Even though the mandatory order had become academic, the unresolved declaration of past and continuing breach gave the Court of Appeal a live issue it had to decide (paras 68–69).
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Read the full judgment: R (Griffiths-Fowell) v Birmingham City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 920 (The National Archives).